



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

COMMAND FILE  
POST 1 JAN 46

IN REPLY REFER TO

5 March 1958

**SECRET**

PERSONAL - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CNO PERSONAL NO. 35

To: Flag and General Officers

Subj: Dope

ITEM 1 - (SECRET - FLAG OFFICERS ONLY)

Recent Submarine Contacts

During 21-26 February at least one new SOSUS contact was developed each day, and on 24 February there were three new contacts, one each off Nantucket, Cape Hatteras, and Cape May.

P2V aircraft provided most of the air search effort, with assistance from Lakehurst ZP, until LEYTE was ordered out of Mayport the evening of 24 February. She commenced operating early on the 25th, as did P5M seaplanes.

After the third SOSUS contact, one DDR and DE joined the search. Another DD and one SS were assigned to the first contact on the 24th. When the total SOSUS count reached six, nine DDs from Norfolk, six DDs from Newport, and five DEs from Newport were ordered to report to COMEASTSEAFRON for OpCon. This latter group, plus LEYTE and six DDs from Mayport were not available for search until the 25th.

By the 28th, all but two SOSUS contacts were closed out. The rule of thumb is that a SOSUS contact is worked over for

**SECRET**

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20360  
1050

**SECRET**

ninety-six hours after the last contact. Forces were gradually reduced to the HUK group plus one DD with air cover on each of the two remaining contacts off Cape May and Cape Hatteras.

The results of these contacts were as follows:

- a. No detection made by surface forces.
- b. One tenuous visual sighting for 20 seconds by P2V co-pilot and lookout, of a snorkel and feather, range five miles, sea state two.
- c. One LOFAR - sonobuoy contact by a specially equipped P2V project aircraft from NADC Johnsville. This contact was held for four hours until relieved by a standard configured P2V.

The Data Processing Unit is making a detailed analysis of the Lofargrams, which will be combined with our rehash of operations to let us get all the information out of this incident that can be gotten.

These contacts give rise to a number of very serious possibilities. The Russians may be conducting surveys for future operations. They could certainly benefit from hydrographic, acoustic, magnetic, electro-magnetic, gravitational and bathy-thermal data.

They may be seeking operational experience, navigation, cruising, and evasion practice.

Or they may be seeking intelligence, reaction to contacts, detection capabilities, new detection systems, and hold-down tactics.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

They could be creating a diversion for any number of reasons. Our schedules have been disrupted and extra money was spent in the attempts to gain contact and identify.

They may be seeking the location of our SOSUS arrays. Recent proximity of contacts to arrays could mean that they already know the locations.

They might be developing the pattern of our operations and merchant ship movements.

These contacts have pointed up several significant things.

a. Communications are not rapid enough.

b. There are not enough readily available search forces.

c. Reaction time to get forces on station is too great.

A HUK group has now been ordered on station in the area at all times.

d. The SOSUS art is in its infancy. Growing pains include accumulating a signature library, training operators, completing the net (including shallow water closure), and getting additional intelligence on Russian submarine characteristics.

e. The Sound Surveillance System must be developed as a bona fide tactical location and tracking capability. It was designed simply to give warning when a sub is in the area.

The increased unidentified submarine activity in recent weeks is very serious. If there are submarines in our waters it is essential that we make contact, maintain contact, and

**SECRET**



**SECRET**

hold to exhaustion. The problem is still relatively small now, but it could grow. Until we can hold a Russian submarine to exhaustion, make it surface and pay our respects to the Captain and offer him assistance - we will not have control of the problem.

**SECRET**

4

ITEM 5 - (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Polaris

The potentialities of the Fleet Ballistic Missile system POLARIS have captured the imagination of many people as a very significant contribution to the deterrent posture of the United States in the missile age.

Two points of caution on this system, however, should be injected at this point before it becomes a run away "band wagon".

First, the Navy should make no wild claims as to what the POLARIS will do. We think it will be good and we have great confidence in the program and in the way things are proceeding. But it has not been fully tested, it has not flown yet in its final configuration, there are many problems yet to be solved in the program, and we want to make sure we do not make a series of claims we cannot back up when the chips go down and POLARIS actually goes to sea.

Second, the Navy does not believe in putting all the nation's eggs in one basket for deterrence. Other retaliatory systems are essential to spread the enemy's efforts over several possibilities in defending himself and figuring out countermeasures. We do not propose to take over someone else's function. The Navy has a lot to do with minimum forces now. We will, however, continue to exploit the seas to the

maximum in strengthening the nation's power throughout the entire spectrum of war possibilities. It is at the extreme end of this spectrum, in all-out nuclear war, that POLARIS fits.

However, since there is increased public interest in the POLARIS system, we do want to be able to give straight answers to queries from all sources on what advantages are visualized in this system. To this end, the following very brief summary is furnished for information.

1. POLARIS will be a mobile system, not just movable.
2. It will be a ready system. It will be ready and mobile at the same time. We won't need several hours to "rig" for battle.
3. It will be difficult to locate at sea, hence has greater survival potential than any fixed system.
4. Attempts to locate it at sea for surprise destruction will give us vitally needed warning of enemy intentions.
5. Because of its mobility it has built-in dispersal features. To change its location, to change its dispersal pattern, takes only an order, nothing else.
6. It will be constantly under U.S. jurisdiction. No property problems are involved for missile-launching sites.
7. Being at sea, it will not draw the fire of enemy attack upon our land areas or populated centers. This applies to those of our allies as well.



8. Being mobile, it will not be a provocative weapon system. It will not be aimed at anything in particular, it will simply be ready. It will thus not suggest preventive war to the enemy.

9. We can build only what is needed to supplement other retaliatory systems up to the size needed to do the job, hence no arms race is involved. (An arms race can develop in fixed systems in which for every site we build, the enemy can build one to neutralize it. A mobile system eliminates this one-for-one race).

10. There is no need for mass production leading to sheer quantity without regard for what is needed to do the job.

11. POLARIS will not lead to the build-up of psychological "pressures" to push the button first in fear that our reprisal capability might be knocked out by surprise.

12. This is important to permit stability during periods of international tension which come and go.

13. With its solid fuel it can be fired immediately.

These points can be used in speeches, or in response to questions about POLARIS. However, the most important objective of the Navy today is to maintain balance, to have adequate capabilities to do all the things Navies are required for in peace and war. POLARIS will do only one of those many jobs.